THE demand by Members of Parliament (MPs) to receive three percent of the national budget, an amount estimated to exceed M1 billion, for the operations of the National Assembly and Senate has sparked controversy and public debate.
This development, introduced via proposed amendments to the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution Bill 2024, is not only financially staggering but also raises serious questions about public accountability, political priorities, and economic sensibility.
The MPs argue that such funding is necessary to enhance the legislature’s oversight function and ensure its independence from the executive.
On the surface, this is a laudable ambition. Parliament must be adequately resourced to fulfil its constitutional mandate. It should have researchers, analysts, logistical support, and the capacity to monitor and scrutinise the executive, especially in a governance environment where corruption, inefficiency, and abuse of power are not uncommon.
However, the method and scale of the MPs’ demand appear both excessive and poorly timed.
While it is true that parliamentary oversight needs strengthening, proposing a jump from the current allocation of M194 million to over M1 billion — a whopping 400% increase — is not only fiscally and morally irresponsible but also politically tone-deaf in the current economic climate.
The nation’s total budget for 2025/26 is M33.6 billion. MPs now want three percent of that to be statutorily allocated to Parliament, regardless of actual operational needs. If adopted, this move would enshrine a blank cheque into the Constitution, shielded from the annual fiscal review processes that all other sectors are subject to. Such a fixed budgetary provision risks undermining sound public financial management and could spark copycat demands from other arms of government.
Law and Justice Minister Richard Ramoeletsi was correct to dub the proposal “frivolous”.
His concerns reflect the foundational principles of budgeting: that allocation must be based on real, justifiable needs, not arbitrary percentages.
The government’s responsibility is to balance competing priorities, being; health, education, infrastructure, social services against the limited resources the country has.
Siphoning off a guaranteed M1 billion annually for Parliament alone would distort this balance and shortchange other sectors with arguably greater and more immediate public impact.
Even if MPs’ motives are rooted in genuine concern for the efficiency of parliamentary work, the current presentation smacks of opportunism.
Their proposal is coming at a time when their budget has just received a notable increase. From M154 million in 2024/25, it has been bumped up to nearly M195 million, which represents a 26% hike.
The Law Minister rightly argues that such a boost already covers capital investments such as vehicles, furniture, and equipment —investments that won’t need repeating annually.
Moreover, the idea that any unspent funds should automatically roll over to the following year, as the amendment also proposes, directly contradicts principles of public budgeting, which stress annual accountability and the return of unused funds to the consolidated revenue fund. Allowing rollovers without stringent conditions opens up avenues for fiscal abuse, hoarding, and mismanagement.
That said, there are parts of the MPs’ argument that warrant attention.
Chair of the Portfolio Committee Chairpersons, Mokhothu Makhalanyane, outlines the dire resource shortages affecting Parliament’s oversight work. He cites a M7.7 billion Social Cluster budget for Health, Education, and Social Development, yet only M300,000 was availed to conduct oversight over those ministries. This points to an acute mismatch between the scope of responsibility and the means to execute it effectively.
Indeed, if Parliament is to play a credible role in safeguarding public funds and curbing corruption, then investment in its capacity must be made.
But this must be targeted, costed, and incremental, not a blunt insertion of a three percent rule into the Constitution. Resources should be allocated based on a well-researched, needs-based budgeting framework.
Parliament should justify line-by-line what it requires — be it researchers, transport, or IT systems, and government must respond appropriately, but not extravagantly.
Another issue raised by Makhalanyane, the need for Parliament to develop its own intelligence and analytical capacity, is compelling.
In a nation often rocked by opaque contracts and corruption scandals, proactive monitoring and independent scrutiny could save the country billions in wastage. But again, a cost-benefit analysis must underpin any resource allocation.
Parliament must also lead by example in transparency, accountability, and financial prudence before it can credibly demand more.
In the final analysis, the MPs’ push for a three percent slice of the budget is a dramatic overreach cloaked in the language of institutional strengthening.
Parliament needs more resources, yes – but not a financial windfall insulated from scrutiny. The public will rightly ask: what has Parliament done with the funds it has already received? What reforms has it implemented to ensure better performance, less absenteeism, and greater legislative output?
Before demanding more money, Parliament must first earn the public’s trust that such funding will translate into better oversight, reduced corruption, and more accountable governance.
Lesotho cannot afford to turn its legislative chamber into a fiscal black hole. The Constitution should never be a tool for budgetary entitlement — it must remain a guide for democratic integrity and responsible stewardship of national resources.
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